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Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS and Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 124 Nev. Adv. 
Op. No. 53 (July 24, 2008)1  
 
INSURANCE LAW - WORKER’S COMPENSATION 
 
Summary 
 Vredenburg appeals a district court order denying her petition for judicial review of her 
workman’s compensation matter.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
  The district court’s dismissal of Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review is reversed and 
remanded with instructions.  The court concludes the workers’ compensation willful self-injury 
exclusion does not preclude a surviving family member from recovering workers’ compensation 
and death benefits where the deceased’s suicide is sufficiently causally linked to his industrial 
industry.  Sufficient causation is established if the claimant shows (1) the deceased suffered an 
industrial injury, (2) the industrial injury caused a psychological condition severe enough to 
overcome the deceased’s rational judgment, and (3) the psychological condition caused the 
deceased to commit suicide.   The appeals officer in this case misapplied the test and her fact-
based conclusions were unsupported by substantial evidence.        
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Danny Vredenburg injured his back when he slipped on a flight of stairs while working 
as a bartender for Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin.  Danny experienced constant pain from this injury.  
He underwent fusion surgery, but it failed to relieve his pain.  He also underwent extensive pain 
management therapy, which also failed to correct his condition.  Danny was eventually 
diagnosed with “failed back syndrome” and prescribed strong pain medication, antidepressants, 
muscle relaxants, epidural injections, and, eventually, a surgically implanted morphine infusion 
pump in his spine.  Nothing helped.  Dr. Kim, one of Danny’s pain management physicians, 
stated that Danny’s chronic pain caused him to become “psychologically de-stabilized.” Danny 
eventually committed suicide.  Dr. Anderson opined that Danny committed suicide because of 
his unrelenting intractable pain.    
 
 Based on Dr. Anderson’s opinion, Sharon Vredenburg, Danny’s surviving spouse, filed a 
workers’ compensation claim for death benefits because Danny took his life because of the 
constant pain from his industrial injury.  The Flamingo’s insurance administrator denied the 
claim.  The hearing officer affirmed the denial and Vredenburg appealed to an appeals officer.  
Although no test had been established to address this issue at the time of the appeal, Vredenburg 
argued that her claim was compensable under the chain-of-causation test followed by the 
Arizona Supreme Court.2  The appeals officer disagreed and affirmed the claim denial because 
(1) the chain-of-causation test was not binding in Nevada; (2) even if it was, Graver Tank was 
distinguishable because Danny’s suicide was deliberate and not the product of insanity; and (3) 
Vredenburg did not conclusively establish that Danny was devoid of rationality and dominated 
                                            
1 By Holly Ludwig. 
2 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 664, 668 (Ariz. 1965). 
by insanity directly caused by his industrial injury.  Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review in 
the district court was denied and this appeal followed.  
 
Discussion 
 The appeals officer’s factual and legal conclusions are reviewed for clear error or an 
abuse of discretion.3  Pure questions of law, like the question addressed in this case, are reviewed 
de novo.4  
 
 N.R.S. 616C.230(1) states that an employee’s death is not compensable under worker’s 
compensation if it results from a “willful intention” to inflict self-injury.  The court has never 
addressed under what circumstances suicides can be considered non-willful under N.R.S. 
616C.230(1).  The issue is whether the court should adopt the more restrictive minority approach 
for causation (voluntary willful choice test) or the majority test (chain-of-causation test).   
 
 The voluntary willful choice test compensates for suicide only if it (1) was caused by an 
uncontrollable impulse or delirium of frenzy, and (2) occurred when the employee was irrational 
and unaware of the physical consequences of his actions.5  The court declines to adopt this 
approach because the first prong is underinclusive in that it only compensates suicides that are 
dramatic and occur within a short time after the injury and the second prong contained an overly 
restrictive criminal standard of insanity.  Moreover, this test has only been adopted by a minority 
of states, many of which have modified it or abandoned it completely.   
 
 Under the chain-of-causation test, the claimant must show a clear chain of causation 
between the industrial injury and the employee’s suicide.6  Specifically, the claimant must prove 
(1) the employee suffered an industrial injury, (2) the industrial injury caused a psychological 
condition severe enough to overcome the employee’s rational judgment, and (3) the 
psychological condition caused the employee to commit suicide.7  The court adopts this 
approach because it largely eliminates the volition and knowledge problems under the voluntar




                                           
8 and it aligns with Nevada’s doctrine of compensable consequences.9 
 
 The appeals officer’s decision in this case is factually and legally erroneous.  First, the 
officer applied the minority willful choice test by concluding that an adequate causal connection 
was not established because Danny deliberately decided to commit suicide.  Whether an 
employee acts deliberately is irrelevant under the chain-of-causation test.  Second, the officer 
 
3 Manwill v. Clark County, 162 P.3d 876, 879 n.4 (Nev. 2007). 
4 Id. at 879. 
5 2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 38.02[2], 38-5 (2007) [hereinafter 
Workers’ Compensation Law]. These two prongs were distilled from Sponatski by later commentators and courts.  
See, e.g., Saunders v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 526 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1975) (citing this distillation with 
approval). 
6 Workers’ Compensation Law § 38.02[1], at 38-5; Modern Worker’s Compensation § 115:5, at 6 (1993). 
7 See Modern Worker’s Compensation § 115:5 at 6 (1993); see, e.g., Stalworth v. W.C.A.B. (County of Delaware), 
815 A.2d 23, 28 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Ahn v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 756 P.2d 40, 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
8 See, e.g., Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 600, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998); In re Dube’s Case, 872 
N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); Globe Sec. Systems Co. v. W.C.A.B., 544 A.2d 953, 957 (Pa. 1988). 
9 See Roberts v. SIIS, 114 Nev. 364, 368-69, 956 P.2d 790, 792-93 (1998); Imperial Palace v. Dawson, 102 Nev. 88, 
91, 715 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1986). 
required Vredenburg to produce conclusive evidence that Danny’s industrial injury caused him 
to become irrational and commit suicide.  However, a claimant must only establish the causal 
nexus by a preponderance of the evidence.10  Last, the officer’s finding that Danny’s suicide 
resulted from something other than his injury is against the weight of the evidence.     
  
Conclusion 
If the cause of an employee’s suicide is causally linked to an industrial injury, it may be a 
non-willful death under Nevada’s worker’s compensation scheme.  The court adopts the chain-
of-causation test to determine whether a sufficient causal nexus has been established.  The 
appeals officer’s decision in this case was clearly erroneous because the officer misapplied the 
chain-of-causation test and her factual findings are unsupported by the record.  Thus, the district 
court’s order denying Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review is reversed and remanded with 
instructions to the district court to remand the matter to the appeals officer for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.      
                                            
10 See McClanahan v. Raley’s, Inc., 117 Nev. 921, 925-26, 34 P.3d 573, 576 (2001) (“‘[P]reponderance of the 
evidence’ merely refers to ‘[t]he greater weight of the evidence.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 
1999)).  Furthermore, to the extent the appeals officer’s decision suggests that Graver Tank requires expert medical 
testimony to succeed under the chain-of-causation test, we disagree.  As one recent Arizona appellate court noted 
when applying Graver Tank, expert medical testimony is not necessary where causation is clearly apparent without 
it.   T.W.M. Custom Framing v. Industrial Com’n, 6 P.3d 745, 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); see United Exposition 
Service Co. v. SIIS, 109 Nev. 421, 424-25, 851 P.2d 423, 425 (1993) (requiring medical testimony or sufficient facts 
to demonstrate the causal connection between an industrial injury and a subsequent injury); see also Workers’ 
Compensation Law § 38.05, at 38-18. 
